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I. INTRODUCTION
The Opposition Brief ("Opposition") Appellee Brittney Fenn ("Fenn") filed
ignores the Record. The only contacts Appellant Mleads Enterprises, Inc. ("Mleads")
had with Utah was a single email Ms. Fenn fortuitously accessed in Utah. The Record
is uncontroverted that Mleads did not intend for any message to be transmitted to any
Utah resident and Mleads could not have known that Ms. Fenn would review the
single email in Utah. This case presents the Utah Supreme Court an opportunity to
hold that due process of law and personal jurisdiction in the Internet age is still a
meaningful bar to being haled into court in a foreign jurisdiction based upon random
and fortuitous events.
Faced with the most minimal jurisdictional facts, Ms. Fenn resorts to
speculation outside the Record about Mleads's other business operations and what
Mleads would have done had Ms. Fenn responded to the single email. The Court's
review is properly restricted to the Record and to the findings below1. For the first
time in this lawsuit, Ms. Fenn argues that she should have been allowed to conduct
additional discovery regarding Mleads's activities unrelated to the lawsuit. These
arguments were not raised below and were not designated as issues on Ms. Fenn's

'Ms. Fenn's Opposition repeatedly refers to "findings" of the Court of Appeals.
This is improper. A Court of Appeals makes conclusions of law and any findings of
fact were made by the trial court.
1

appeal to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Ms. Fenn's speculations are not properly
before the court.
Mleads did not aim its communications to the State of Utah or to any of its
residents. The Court of Appeals' "single email rule" renders any protection for
personal jurisdiction illusory and creates a dangerous precedent. Consequently, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Ms. FENN MISSTATES THE RECORD ON THE ISSUE OF PURPOSEFUL INTENT

Ms. Fenn argues the e-mail at issue "was sent directly to a . . . a specific
location . . . in Utah." (Opposition, p. 14.)2 In truth, Mleads caused an email to be sent
to an address which, unbeknownst to Mleads, a Utah resident accessed. The e-mail in
question was addressed to Brittney Fenn at <BAF@heartslc.com>. Ms. Fenn's email
address - like every email address - is location neutral. An email address alone does
not reveal the location at which messages sent to it will be viewed. Indeed, the trial
court concluded "Mleads had no knowledge, prior to the email being sent. .. that a
solicitation would be directed to a resident of [the State of Utah]." (Record, p. 88.)

2

Ms. Fenn also notes that "[t]he e-mail was . . . addressed to and received by a
Utah resident," (Opposition, p. 15), and that Mleads "sent an . .. email directly to a
Utah resident." (Opposition, p. 12; see also Opposition, p. 13 ("[Mleads] sent one
[message] directly to Ms. Fenn in Sandy, Utah"); Opposition, p. 12 ("Mleads .. .
delivered the offending email to Ms. Fenn's home computer"),.)
2

The Court of Appeals reiterated "Mleads did not know specifically that the agent
would send an email to Fenn or to any Utah resident." (See Court of Appeals Decision,
at *P2 (emphasis added).) Courts uniformly recognize that the sender of an email
cannot control the location at which the email may be viewed. An "e-mail [can be]
retrieved from anywhere in the world." Kaempe v. Myers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18386 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Hydro Eng'g. Inc. v. Landa. Inc..
231 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134 (D. Utah 2002) (citing Kaempe for the same proposition).
Thus, the unequivocal facts in the Record are that Mleads did not purposefully direct
any messages to the State of Utah.
Ms. Fenn speculates that Mleads "certainly can require information regarding
the location of the main residence for potential recipients prior to sending out their
emails . . . It would not take much to do so." (Opposition, p. 13.) This argument
ignores that an email address is not location-specific. Ms. Fenn does not, and cannot,
explain how Mleads could have translated <BAF@heartslc.com> to reveal the location
of her main residence.
Ms. Fenn's argument also is contrary to the findings below. As the trial court
found, the third party marketing company hired by Mleads did not provide "any
personal or contact information about [Ms. Fenn] prior to the transmission of the [email] nor would have provided such information even if requested by Mleads/'
(Record, p. 88.) Even if the Internet permitted emails to be viewed only in select
3

locations, the Record is uncontroverted that the single email was sent by a third party
marketing company which did not (and would not) communicate the location of the
recipient of the email. Ms. Fenn's unsupported conclusion that "it would not take
much to" "require information regarding the location of the main residence for
potential recipients prior to sending out their emails" should be disregarded.
Ms. Fenn has not cited any fact in the Record indicating Mleads knew or could
have known the "main residence" of the account holder of <BAF(5)heartslc.com>.
The Record in this case is clear that Mleads had no knowledge of Ms. Fenn's state of
residence and that the only jurisdictional facts at bar are a single location-neutral email
address.
B.

Ms. FENN IMPROPERLY SPECULATES ABOUT EVIDENCE N O T IN THE RECORD

The Opposition is filled with speculation and presumption about what Mleads
could have been doing. For example, Ms. Fenn argues Mleads "hired a Florida based
company to send . . . emails, presumably all over the country." (Opposition, p. 14.)
Ms. Fenn further opines that while the total number of e-mails is not known they
"probably number at least in the tens-of-thousands," (Opposition, p. 14) and that
"[t]he solicitation would be and probably has been sent to computer terminals all over
the world, including to other Internet users in Utah." (Opposition, p. 18.) Ms.
Fenn's speculations ignore this Court's pronouncement that "[the Court's] power of
review is strictly limited to the record presented on appeal.... Parties claiming error
4

below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to support their
allegations with an adequate record." Gorostieta v. Parkinson. 2000 UT 99, PI5 (Utah
2000). The Court should disregard Ms. Fenn's speculations regarding Mleads's
alleged other contacts with the State of Utah because they are unsupported by any
facts in the Record or citations thereto.
C.

DUE PROCESS REQUIRES "SOMETHING M O R E " THAN PLACING PRODUCTS OR
EMAILS IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE

Ms. Fenn analogizes to cases involving products released into the stream of
commerce and cases involving interactive web sites. (See, e.g., Opposition, p. 11
(citing Asahi Metal Indus Co.. Ltd. v. Superior Court. 480 U.S. 102, 107 (1987));
Opposition p. 17 (citing iAccess, Inc. v. WEBcard Techs., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1183,
1187 (D. Utah 2002)). These cases are unavailing. In effect, Ms. Fenn argues merely
marketing over the Internet is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on a defendant.
Courts have summarily rejected arguments that the advent of the Internet renders
decades of due process jurisprudence moot. With the Internet, as with every other
means of communication, there must be "something more" to comport to
constitutional due process.
Ms. Fenn's reliance on "stream of commerce" authority does not support the
proposition Ms. Fenn proffers. Due process jurisprudence, including the cases Ms.
Fenn cites, consistently provides that merely injecting a product into the stream of

5

commerce is not sufficient to support jurisdiction:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is
not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to
serve the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for
the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing
channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the
sales agent in the forum State. But a defendant's awareness that the stream
of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not
convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act
purposefully directed toward the forum State.
Asahi Metal Indus Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 (1987) (emphasis
added) (quoted at Opposition, p. 11). Ms. Fenn relies on the "additional conduct"
analysis in Asahi and speculates that the additional conduct is present here. However,
the Record is absent any facts of such additional conduct. Moreover, the basic
principle of Asahi is controlling: merely placing a product in the stream of commerce
is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Applying Asahi to the present case, the
single email Ms. Fenn received is insufficient to hale Mleads into court in Utah.
The operation of an Internet website can constitute the purposeful availment of
a forum state "if the website is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended
interaction with residents of the state." Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282
F.3d 883, 890 (6th Or. 2002); Zippo Mfg. Co, v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1126-27 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the defendant's decision to conduct
business via the Internet with Pennsylvania residents constituted purposeful
6

availment). Merely because the Internet is a network of computers which are globally
connected does not render the Fourteen Amendment moot any more than interstate
phone lines rendered the purposeful availment requirement irrelevant. As the court
stated in iAccess:
It is true that a website may form the basis of personal jurisdiction. Courts
analyze the level and type of activity conducted on the website in question
to determine jurisdiction. A passive website that does no more than make
information available cannot by itself form the basis ofjurisdiction. Courts
require "something more" than a website's existence that indicates the
defendant purposefully directed its activities in a substantial way toward the
forum state to find personal jurisdiction.
iAccess, Inc. v. WEBcard Techs., Inc.. 182 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1187 (D. Utah 2002).
The court in iAccess analogized creating a web site to placing a product in the stream
of commerce: "[cjreating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce,
may be felt nationwide—or even worldwide—but, without more, it is not an act
purposefully directed toward the forum state." Id. The court reached a similar result
in Stewart v. Hennesey. noting that "[f]or purposes of specific jurisdiction, the critical
factor becomes the minimum contacts the website creates with the forum state."
Stewart v. Hennesey. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1201 (D. Utah 2002).
D.

WHETHER ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IS APPROPRIATE IS NOT BEFORE THE
COURT

In her Opposition, Ms. Fenn submits for the first time that she should have been
allowed to conduct additional discovery. (See, e.g., Opposition at p. 14.) However,
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Ms. Fenn failed to raise this issue in either the trial court or before the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, Ms. Fenn has waived this issue.
In order to preserve an issue for appeal uthe issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."
Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Peebles. 2002 UT 48, P 14 (2002) (citing
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). In this case, Ms.
Fenn did not move the trial court for additional discovery. Mleads filed a Motion to
Dismiss in response to the Complaint supported by the Declaration of Shay Tyler. As
noted by the trial court, "[t]he Opposition memorandum [filed by Ms. Fenn in
response] [was] not supported by affidavit." (Record, p. 84 (emphasis added).) That
opposition (Record, pp. 53-64) nowhere requested additional discovery or even
suggested that additional discovery would be appropriate. Because Ms. Fenn failed to
present "the issue [of additional discoveiy] to the trial court in such a way that the trial
court ha[d] an opportunity to rule on th[e] issue," Ms. Fenn failed to preserve the issue
on appeal. It is fundamentally unfair for Mleads now, for the first time before the
Utah Supreme Court, to have to defend against claims of what might have been
discovered. Accordingly, the Court should reject this argument.
E.

SUBJECTING MLEADS TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN UTAH DOES NOT
COMPORT WITH TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE

The facts of this case are uncontroverted: Ms. Fenn seeks to recover ten dollars
8

($10.00) in statutory damages for a single email that Mleads could not have known
would have been viewed in Utah. Ms. Fenn has not suffered any personal injuries and
is not seeking to make herself whole for any injury to her business, person or property.
The State of Utah's interest is not as strong in this case as it would be if Ms. Fenn
were seeking to vindicate actual injury. The burden for Mleads to defend against this
case in Utah is significant when compared to Ms. Fenn's alleged injury. Conferring
personal jurisdiction based upon a single email offends traditional notions of fair play
and justice and renders any restrictions on personal jurisdiction illusory.
III. CONCLUSION
Ms. Fenn seeks to confer personal jurisdiction on Mleads based upon a single
email. Mleads did not know Ms. Fenn was a Utah resident nor did Mleads intend for
any message to be transmitted to any Utah resident. Both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals came to this conclusion. The evidence in the Record is Mleads did not
purposefully direct the e-mail in question to any residents of Utah. Accordingly,
Mleads did not purposefully avail itself to this jurisdiction. Faced with such minimal
facts, Ms. Fenn seeks to prejudice the court with speculations outside of the Record.
The Utah Supreme Court is faced with a clear Record and a fundamental legal
question: whether a single email alone is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.
Finding personal jurisdiction based upon a single email would overturn decades of due
process jurisprudence and effectively allow any defendant to be haled into court across
9

state lines without meaningful contact to the state. Therefore, Mleads respectfully
requests the Court reverse the Court of Appeals and restore personal jurisdiction as a
meaningful bar to being haled into court in a foreign jurisdiction based upon random
and fortuitous contacts.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2005.
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